Landmine Treaty after 10 Years: a Precursor?
by Robin Collins

Ten years ago, more than 120 countries signed the Ottawa Treaty banning the use, production and trade in anti-personnel landmines (APMs). The relationship built between civil society and friendly governments working outside normal diplomatic channels came to be known as the Ottawa Process. Its goal was to achieve clear humanitarian ends effectively and quickly. On most accounts, the package was a rip-roaring success story.

Even countries that stayed out of the treaty, including the United States, admit there were major achievements. Richard Kidd, with the Office of the U.S. Secretary of State writes in a recent blog that the Ottawa Convention “undeniably led to reductions in the humanitarian hazards generated by indiscriminately used anti-personnel landmines.” The U.S. (to this day a non-signatory to the treaty) has pumped in more funding for mine action than anyone else.

Was the Ottawa Treaty a unique success story and an aberration, or was it the precursor of the new way of doing global business?

 It is difficult to judge. In one sense, the landmine treaty was an easy thing to do. It came on the heels of post-Cold War humanitarian imperatives, and from an upsurge in NGO/government collaboration that saw not just a treaty on APMs, but also the treaty creating an International Criminal Court, a Child Soldiers Protocol and even advances on the nuclear weapons and small arms campaign fronts. One common denominator for much of that exuberance was the proactive Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who exploited an opportunity within his caucus and at the pleasure of his prime minister to push the human security agenda hard, fast and forward.

The Ottawa Treaty has had a human impact beyond what would have been achieved if it was loop-holed to accommodate the U.S., Russia, China and some of the other major mine producers and users. The flow of landmines was quickly capped, mines were effectively ostracized as weapons, and major players felt inclined to cease use and trade of APMs even while refusing to sign the treaty. Around the world, there are now an estimated 5,750 victims a year instead of 26,000. We can safely say up to 200,000 more people have lived or escaped loss of limbs because of the treaty and campaign. Hundreds of thousands, maybe millions more, have had their fields made safe for agriculture.

Civil society input into policy-making is a complex animal. While there are now almost 1,500 non-governmental organizations involved, originally there were only a handful of leading organizations in the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and, within those, a tiny group of individuals who actually articulated the campaign’s goals. Any other arrangement – towards wider consultation and consensus – would have been both less effective and unworkable in the time constraints available. By late 1996 and with a new foreign minister at the helm, Canada was actually ahead of the NGOs. Whereas the ICBL had been pressing for a treaty by the year 2000, Mr. Axworthy cleverly stepped forward and called for a treaty by the end of 1997 (and he got it).

Without Canada, and without a determined Axworthy, would there have been a landmine treaty at all? That is a very difficult question to answer with confidence. It depends on how we assess the role of civil society in policy-making. Political scientist Maxwell Cameron (co-editor of a participant’s history of the landmine campaign, To Walk Without Fear) in 1998 wrote what still rings true to me: “Advocates of democratization [of foreign policy] should rest their defence of the civil society/government partnership on publicity, not on participation.” In other words, the Ottawa Process was successful mainly because it generated public pressure through wide exposure of a humanitarian issue. Governments were only then inclined to sit down together with NGOs to consider solutions that governments ultimately formulated and signed off on. That is a long way from saying (as critics at polar extremes have alleged) governments were “held hostage” to NGO whims or NGOs were co-opted by governments.

The landscape is different today than it was 10 years ago. Many Canadian organizations feel they have less “access” to government consultations than before. Some believe they are being sidelined and ignored. Resurgent old-style politicians will argue that civil society had too much access in the Axworthy era and, in any case, that era was ‘done’ long before the Harper government entered the fray. And there is one good barometer we can use to compare ‘then’ with ‘now’: It is still uncertain whether the current related campaign for a cluster munitions treaty will be as successful or as clear-cut.

Concern about cluster munitions has been festering internationally for decades but the weapon achieved notoriety only after the landmine campaign brought attention to all ‘victim-activated’ weapons. Cluster munitions that fail to detonate as designed exhibit very similar risks to civilians as do anti-personnel mines. Bringing cluster bombs under an international treaty therefore follows naturally out of norms and obligations established by the Ottawa Landmine Convention.

The cluster munitions campaign now appears to be going through the same policy grinder too. Except this time, it’s led by Norway and known as the “Oslo Process.” Again the U.S., armed with a huge inventory of problematic cluster bombs, is not participating. Canada is “in” but not a leading country. Many of the same core organizations and individuals who worked on landmines are pressing for the best possible outcome for ‘clusters.’ What will the final treaty look like? Will it be comprehensive and effective and, if there are exceptions, will they be reasonable ones?

The policy organism has evolved and matured since the mid-1990s in several countries. Many democratic governments appear to prefer including civil society input into the policy process. That contribution, after all, is a particularly effective catalyst when driven by shared humanitarian imperatives.

It is impossible to believe that this modern human security approach with its enhanced democratic underpinnings can ever be dismissed outright. There is a lot to be gained by everyone in efficiencies and in the humanization of political agendas, even if the goals are temporarily left unfulfilled by the occasional stubborn administration.

Robin Collins (current chair of WFMC Council) was a board member and chair of Mines Action Canada for several years. He continues to monitor progress of the landmine and cluster munitions campaigns and moderates an international deminer’s listserv.