

The Responsibility to Protect as an Evolving International Norm

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Introduction

The purpose of my paper is to examine the responsibility to protect in the context of emerging and evolving normative patterns within global society and the interstate system. There is not yet a comprehensive theory of international norms that can adequately explain how norms emerge, how they are diffused (locally, nationally, regionally and globally), how they challenge and weaken existing norms, how they become robust, how they undermine or soften other norms, how they are routinized and institutionalized, how they are replaced or diminished in importance, and how they eventually die. But we do know enough about norms to trace empirically their development and/or evolution over time.

In the limited time I have, I will explore the emergence and evolution of the international norm that undergirds the new thinking with respect to responsibility to protect populations that are at risk and try to determine the extent to which there is a normative clash or normative fit with the existing and established sovereignty/non-intervention norm. But first, it is important to establish just what we do know about norms.

Understanding Norms

The issue of norms has become an important subject among academics over the past few decades. In part, this stems from the early work of Krasner et. al. that analyzed and explored the underlying characteristics of regimes. In that work, Krasner conceptualized regimes as those "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors in a particular issue area converge".

Norms, in that definition of regimes, are distinguishable from principles, rules and decision-making procedures. However, it is evident that norms are in some ways linked to those three elements of a regime. What separates a norm from an 'idea' is the fact that, unlike an idea which can remain in the head of an individual, norms have to be intersubjective to take effect. They are viewed as intersubjective standards or patterns of behaviour (hence the link to principles) that prescribe and proscribe the appropriateness of a given act (hence the link to rules).

These generally accepted standards help to regulate human and social behaviour. They stipulate conditions under which actors behave, in effect creating regularity and consistency in the behaviour of those who subscribe to them. [Katzenstein] In this sense,

norms are essential to the functioning and existence of any society in that they represent shared standards of behaviour. [See Audie Klotz; and Keck & Sikkink]

Norms are both regulative and constitutive. They are regulative in the sense that they prescribe and proscribe behaviour — they regulate how individuals, states and organizations act. They are constitutive in the sense that they define particular characteristics of an actor or thing, e.g. the sovereignty norm defines what a state is.

Finnemore and Sikkink envisaged the life cycle of norms as going through three stages:

1. *Conception* — the birth of a new norm (usually with the assistance of a mid-wife — a norm entrepreneur);
2. *Diffusion/Cascading* — when a critical mass of actors agree to abide by an emerging norm, thus creating a tipping point of wide-spread acceptance;
3. *Internalization and Institutionalization* — when the norm becomes robust enough to be taken for granted, so to speak, and actors conform to the norm in a routinized, non-reflective manner.

One can add to this life cycle of norms two other possible stages: 4) *norm contestation* and 5) *norm dissolution*. Established norms can be challenged at anytime by a new or emerging norm. When that happens, the robustness of the existing norm is tested. It seems to me that in such cases, the already established norm, if it is robust enough, can resist the newcomer(s). However, if there is an Achilles' heel in the established norm, then there are two possible reaction/responses: either the established norm will make adjustments to accommodate the challenge from the emerging norm or; the established norm will be weakened to the point where it loses traction and ultimately meets its demise.

At stage one, norm advocacy is essential for getting the norm noticed and providing it with the characteristic of intersubjectivity. Norm advocacy requires norm entrepreneurs who may be dissatisfied with an existing state of affairs or actors' behaviour and felt strong enough about it to introduce an alternative way of behaving or a new standard of conduct. To convince other actors, the norm entrepreneur must possess powerful and convincing rhetorical and communication skills. Whether the underlying motive for the introduction of the norm is altruistic or based on self-interest, the arguments used by the norm entrepreneur for broad acceptance of the emerging norm would have to be compelling enough to sway fellow-actors into buying into this new norm.

To be truly successful, norm entrepreneurs have to understand the process of coalition building. This usually comes in the form of enlisting, first, like-minded actors to the cause (usually those who are considered good international citizens) and then using this alliance to build momentum for the acceptance of the norm among other, perhaps less-convinced, actors. [See Franceschet & Knight] In the case of an international norm, the norm entrepreneur would likely have a good sense of how international organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) operate, the nature of the caucuses operating within them, how coalitions are built, how issues get placed on the agenda, and how

support for a norm can be generated both informally (through corridor and backroom diplomacy) and formally (with the tabling of a resolution or motion). A good example of this can be found in the Ottawa process, which led to the banning of anti-personnel landmines by the international community.

The second stage in the life cycle of a norm is the diffusion stage. Robust norms have a persuasive quality about them. They are intrinsically convincing and, as a result, are easily diffused. To achieve the cascading or tipping effect, norm entrepreneurs and like-minded actors would have to convince international, regional and national institutions to incorporate the norm in their *modus operandi* and perhaps even in their rules and laws.

The cascading effect of the norm will be aided by pressing issues within the environment that call attention to the need for the norm. So for instance, the genocide in Rwanda, or the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, cried out for the establishment of a norm that would prevent such occurrences in the future. Similarly, the rapid deterioration of the Somali state and the internecine clan violence that accompanied that slippery slide to statelessness caused many within the international community to offer up a norm that would support military and humanitarian intervention even without the consent of a government in that case. Linked to the above example are post-conflict states in which the government is unable to govern for whatever reason. In such cases, some in the international community propose a norm that would support the establishment of an interim outside authority until such time as elections can be held and the local people are ready to govern themselves. These kinds of environmental issues can cause the tipping effect as a critical mass of actors become convinced that the new norm is in fact needed.

Stage three is characterized by internalization and institutionalization of the norm. At this stage, the norm is robust enough to resist challenge and become, more or less, standard practice. Essentially, norms are institutionalized when the majority (of actors) in a system accepts them. In such cases, they become part and parcel of everyday practice and serve as action-guiding devices. Clearly, the sovereignty/non-intervention norm is an internalized and institutionalized norm. It is embedded in the UN Charter and has guided the actions of the international community for much of the twentieth century.

But settled norms will, at some point in their existence, have to compete with emerging norms. Hence the need to consider the two further stages in the norm's life cycle that are advanced above. Some emerging norms are compatible with the underlying ideas constituting a settled norm (normative fit). While others may offer a stiff challenge to institutionalize norms because they are competing directly with those norms (normative clash). The robustness of an existing norm can be seen when the established norm beats back a competing norm. But robustness can also be exhibited when an established norm 'swallows up' or incorporates an emerging norm into its structure.

The extent of the normative fit or normative clash when the norms of sovereignty/non-intervention and the responsibility to protect are pitted against each other is an empirical issue. It is clear that norms can evolve over time through reflexive adaptation

by accommodating emerging norms. It is also equally evident that norms created at a specific cultural, political, social and historical juncture may require some evolution if they are to survive. Failure to evolve may lead to the persistent erosion of norms. Norms can face a more direct, and possibly fatal, challenge when actors, particularly materially powerful ones, consistently violate or denigrate them. If practices engaged in by actors are inconsistent with a given (formerly widely accepted) norm, then we can expect a degeneration of the norm, its erosion over time, and its eventual demise. In other words, the norm becomes less and less robust until finally it is no longer 'persuasive' as a regulating device.

We are witnessing today, repeated violations of existing norms that have served the internationally community well over the past 55 years and more. Some states have been chipping away at some of these established norms and creating fissures in the norms that weaken them. It is becoming necessary for norm entrepreneurs to come together and determine which of the established norms need to be maintained and strengthened, which ones need to be adjusted and evolved, and which one need to put in the dustbin of history. What is required is a conscious and concrete strategy for doing so. Otherwise, we will witness the slow erosion of established norms and inconsistency and irregularity of behaviour among actors in the international system -- a sure way to drift toward anarchy and a new world disorder.

Normative Clash

With the exponential increase in civil conflict since the end of the Cold War, the international community and individual states have been faced with a major dilemma. How can people at risk receive protection if their government is either unwilling or unable to do so? And, how can that protection be provided by outside agents without undermining the norm of sovereignty/non-intervention?

The sovereignty/non-intervention norm begins from the premise that individual states are autonomous actors each with a private and depoliticized domain of action within which citizens may exercise their autonomy through their constitutional structures.¹ The non-intervention norm therefore carves out space for the state, as a collective actor, that allows the state to determine the direction of its own domestic affairs. Since the state is sovereign and not answerable to any higher power, matters that are within its domestic jurisdiction ought not to be tampered with by outside agents, according to the well-established norm. More importantly, that norm especially guards against the use of external military force to interfere with domestic policies that individual governments and their citizens make; or so the argument goes.

However, in recent decades there have been several challenges to the notion of state sovereignty that has led the sovereignty/non-intervention norm to undergo some adjustments. We know that powerful states have routinely violated the sovereignty of weaker states, despite the fact that the principle of state sovereignty is entrenched in international law -- e.g. in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. It is also evident that globalization forces have made state boundaries permeable. Particularly since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed the dissolution of states (e.g. the once powerful Soviet

Union quickly became dismembered and Yugoslavia broke up into 6 different states). The weakening of the norms relating to state borders presents a major challenge to the norm of state sovereignty.

There has also been a growing practice, in the latter portion of the Cold War era and particularly since the end of the Cold War, to broaden the interpretation of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The UN Charter allows for some intervention in the internal affairs of a state that deliberately poses a threat to international peace and security. Chapter VII of the UN Charter over-rides the non-intervention article in cases where deviant states commit acts of aggression against other states. Thus, when Iraq invaded Kuwait this was immediately identified as a violation of the UN Charter and dealt with through an UN-approved collective security arrangement.

However, in an attempt to deal with the growing surge in civil wars, the UN Security Council has broadened the threats to the security to include gross violation of human rights, apartheid, genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, and most violent conflict that could spill over into a particular region or sub-region. What has clearly motivated the decision of the Security to expand the notion of threats to global peace appears to be the excessive loss of life and human costs that result from aberrant domestic human rights abuses, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The UN and other international actors have repeatedly intervened in the internal affairs of states whose government are either unable or unwilling to protect their citizens from gross abuses. In some cases, the state is the actual perpetrator of the abuse against its civilian population.

Now, with the establishment of *ad hoc* International Tribunals and the International Criminal Court (ICC), there is another challenge to state sovereignty. As the ICISS report states: the establishment of these judicial bodies signal that atrocities committed against human beings by their own governments — including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the perpetration of genocide — may trump claims of sovereignty.²

Another challenge to the state sovereignty/non-intervention norm has come about as a result of the incapacity of some states to exercise effective control and authority over their territories and populations. State sovereignty in such cases has become little more than a legal fiction for these failed or quasi states.³ Indeed, failure to carry out the obligation of statehood can be considered a violation of the UN Charter s Article 4. It certainly calls into question the sovereignty of those states. We have seen in the cases of Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia (to give a few examples) that the absence of a functioning government can result in internecine violence, chronic disorder and even anarchy. Under those conditions, innocent lives are at risk, human security is threatened, individuals are forced to become refugees or internally displaced persons, and humanitarian assistance is badly needed. Intervention by external agents may be the only means of restoring some sense of order and stability and of providing the security and humanitarian assistance required. But such intervention again further erodes the state sovereignty/non-intervention norm.

If intervention in the internal affairs of a state for humanitarian reasons is considered an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, then how should the international community respond to situations like the ones in Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, the DRC, Iraq and even South Korea — for that matter? While there may be an ethical and moral obligation to assist people at risk, wherever they happen to live, it is difficult to challenge the robust norm of sovereignty/non-intervention with an emerging norm that allows for military and humanitarian intervention in states that have over the years helped to establish and routinize the sovereignty/non-intervention norm.

The above challenges to the state sovereignty/non-intervention norm can be seen as a kind of norm contestation, with an emerging right to intervene norm clashing with the established norm. Such normative contestation reflects the reality that the international normative architecture is polymorphic rather than isomorphic. Any emerging norm must make the convincing case that it is either a logical extension of an existing norm or a necessary alternative to it.⁴ Ann Florini argues that when there are contested norms, the selection made will depend very much on the relative prominence of each, their relative compatibility or coherence with other prevailing norms, and the extent to which they fit the existing environmental conditions.⁵

Normative Fit

Ramesh Thakur has argued that the doctrine of national sovereignty in its absolute and unqualified form, which gave rulers protection against attack from without while engaged within in the most brutal assault on their own citizens, has gone with the wind.⁶

However, this statement presupposes that such an absolutist notion of sovereignty has existed in the past. In fact, this has never been the case. As the Report of the ICISS points out: The defence of state sovereignty, by even its strongest supporters, does not include any claim of the unlimited power of a state to do what it wants to its own people. It goes on to say that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility: externally — to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state.⁷

Shifting the debate from the right of external actors to intervene in the internal affairs of a state that is putting its citizens at risk to the responsibility of sovereign states to protect their populations was a shrewd move on the part of the ICISS members. In doing so, the emphasis also shifted from normative clash to normative fit.

Norms do not exist in a vacuum. They are part of an environment/space that states, international organizations, and civil society occupy. That environment does not remain static, although at times the shifts and changes to it may seem imperceptible to some. I argue here that the environment within which states operate and within which norms vie for attention is one that has undergone significant changes over the last 58 years or so.

The first element of the change in the international environment can be seen with the acceptance of norms that support the notion of universal human rights protection. Such norms are found embedded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in 1948), in the UN Charter (see the Preamble and Article 1), and in the constitutions of many regional organizations. These norms have been strengthened over time by state action, the actions of international governmental organizations, like the UN, the EU, the CSCE, the OAU, the OAS, ASEAN, the Commonwealth and La Francophonie. They have also received traction through the efforts of NGOs and civil societal groups. John Ikenberry observes that with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a great historical divide was crossed: before 1945, human rights were not a significant aspect of world politics; after 1945, international human rights norms emerged from the fringes onto centre stage.⁸

Despite the retardation of human rights norms during the Cold War, the range and scope of rights championed by groups expanded through the work of UN-sponsored world conferences and commissions. The Helsinki Act (1975), the actions of US Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, and the activity of several citizens movements, activist networks, and NGOs — both in the West and East, lent credence to the notion of the cascading of human rights norms. Indeed, what appears to have occurred was that out of this activity emerged a set of transnational legal norms that were not dependent on the state per se. In fact, transnational groups increasingly monitored state conduct and deviant states, in some cases, were subject to international sanctions and arms embargoes as a means of bringing them in line with the new transnational legal norms.

As Cold War tensions diffused and then entirely dissolved in the late 1980s and 1990s, the status of democracy also changed dramatically. The ethical promise of individual autonomy through democracy became institutionalized in a variety of global governing institutions. Old norms and institutions were adapted in ways that made democratic legitimacy of central importance. Additionally, new practices in a variety of global policy areas were premised explicitly on promoting democracy. Important scholars, state leaders, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society actors began to speak of an emerging right to democracy. Reflecting on this, the Commission on Global Governance claimed that: there is a growing consensus that democracy, whatever form it may take, is a global entitlement, a right that should be available and protected for all.⁹ The UN established in April 1992 an electoral assistance unit that facilitates transitions to democracy in states with little or no history of democracy.¹⁰

Both of the above changes in the environment within which states operate have important implications for the established state sovereignty/non-intervention norm as well as the emerging responsibility to protect norm. States can no longer use sovereignty as a fig leaf to cover up human rights abuses of their citizens. For one thing, states that try to do this are being monitored closely by international agencies and other states. Secondly, the expansion of the democracy norm has led to a shift away from state sovereignty to popular sovereignty. The security of states, while still important, now has to share centre stage with human security.

The responsibility to protect norm emerged at a propitious moment when changes in the international political and security environment began to support other compatible emerging norms (e.g., human rights norms and democracy norms). Instead of there being a normative clash what we have witnessing with the ICISS report is an attempt at developing a normative fit between state sovereignty/non-intervention and the responsibility to protect via intervention.

This fit is described in the following manner by the ICISS co-chairs:

The Commission believes that responsibility to protect resides first and foremost with the state whose people are directly affected. This fact reflects not only international law and the modern state system, but also the practical realities of who is best placed to make a positive difference. The domestic authority is best placed to take action to prevent problems from turning into potential conflicts.

When solutions are needed, it is the citizens of a particular state who have the greatest interest and the largest stake in the success of those solutions, in ensuring the domestic authorities are fully accountable for their actions or inactions .¹¹

However, while the state whose people are directly at risk may have the default responsibility to protect, the international community does have a residual responsibility to protect citizens who are not being protected by their governments. This is considered a fall-back responsibility, which is activated only when a state is either unwilling or unable to fulfill its sovereign responsibility to protect its citizens, or when that state is the perpetrator of crimes against its own people.

Mainstreaming of the Responsibility to Protect Norm

For anyone reading UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan's recent Annual Report, it becomes clear that the responsibility to protect norm is gaining in robustness. This section simply highlights some of the examples that the Secretary General has provided to demonstrate the extent to which this norm is being mainstreamed in the activities of the UN system.

During 2002-2003, there has been considerable activity on the UN's part towards ensuring that protection issues are placed squarely into the policies and decision-making processes of UN Member States and of the UN system at large. Some of the important steps taken in this regard include the following:

- The UN entities in Afghanistan, Burundi and Iraq have used the aide-memoire formulated by the Security Council (S/PRST/2002/6, annex) to assemble an active collaborative framework for the protection of civilians. This has resulted in a more coherent inter-agency response to humanitarian crises.
- In Iraq, human rights officers deployed with the Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq developed a policy framework on human rights protection together with UN humanitarian bodies and other international organizations to guide humanitarian assistance.

- UN human rights advisers led inter-agency technical working groups on protection-related issues in Côte d'Ivoire and Iraq.
- Certain peacekeeping missions of the UN, regional organizations, and individual states have included protection principles in their mandates (e.g. the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Economic Community of West African States, and French forces in Côte d'Ivoire).
- A series of regional workshops was launched in October 2002 on issues of protecting civilians in armed conflict. Since that time, workshops have been held in East Asia and the Pacific, Europe, the South Pacific, southern Africa and West Africa, with additional workshops planned in the coming months in Latin America and South Asia. These workshops aim to examine the nature of humanitarian challenges during complex emergencies within each region and to explore possible means of addressing such challenges from a regional perspective.¹²

All of the above activity cited by Kofi Annan supports the notion that the responsibility to protect norm is not limited to the responsibility to react to an actual human catastrophe, but must also involve the responsibility to prevent such an incident from occurring, and the responsibility to rebuild if such a catastrophe is allowed to take place.

The responsibility to Prevent

The responsibility to prevent human tragedies depends heavily on sound intelligence and early warning mechanisms. The major problem for the international community is that its intelligence is extremely limited and its early warning devices are, to say the least, *ad hoc* and unstructured. This problem is of course replicated at the regional and sub-regional levels. If governments are serious about the responsibility to prevent, they should develop ways of improving the early warning system of the UN and regional bodies and put some of their intelligence resources at the disposal of the UN Secretariat. However, given the recent performance of the intelligence agencies of two of the most sophisticated countries in this area — the US and the UK, there is no guarantee that state intelligence will be any better than the intelligence the UN receives from its field staff and NGOs stationed in potential conflict zones.

It would seem that a better way of ensuring conflict prevention is through economic sustainable development and social transformation — both central to the concept of building sustainable peace. Sustainability in this case refers to a program's ability to produce outputs and benefits that are valued highly enough to command continued resources and attention, and thus ensure continued outputs. Implied in this definition is the notion that both the donors in the international community and recipient states must accept the value of the activity and commit to maintaining it for the long haul. The focus of the responsibility to prevent should therefore be on those long-term development projects that build indigenous capacity and peaceable interactions in states generally prone to violent conflict. The whole idea is to nip conflicts in the bud before they erupt into violent ones, rather than wait until the violence erupts before taking measures to quell it.¹³

The Canadian government would do well to integrate this long-term approach in its economic, development and foreign policy as a means of contributing to the mainstreaming of the responsibility to protect norm. In the meantime, it is worth remembering that the UN Charter offers a number of conflict prevention tools that could be put at the disposal of states: e.g. enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and resort to regional agencies or arrangements.

The Responsibility to React

The ICISS report identifies the responsibility to react as a seminal element of the responsibility to protect norm. If prevention fails, then some form of intervention may be required to forestall loss of life and property. This does not mean an automatic trigger for military intervention. Indeed, such intervention should generally be used in the rarest of occasions and after other measures have been exhausted. Again, the UN Charter is a useful guide. It proposes the use of such measures as the complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations, as a first reaction to the signs of conflict. If the violence intensifies, then the Charter suggests the employment of economic sanctions or arms embargoes, military demonstrations, blockades or, as a last resort, coercive military interventions.

The linkage of political and social stability to the cessation of military hostilities in a target country leaves open the prospect for the use of armed force as an optional tool in the responsibility to react kit. To think otherwise would be tantamount to putting on conceptual blinkers. Even in many post-conflict theatres there are low intensity civil conflict that can spiral out of control unless a credible deterrent military force is present. One only has to take a look at the conditions that exist in such war-torn countries Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Congo (Zaire), Ethiopia, Eritrea, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan to recognize the potential need for a military insurance policy that can positively influence local conflict dynamics so as to enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian operations and create the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. A recent concrete example of this reaction is the British military intervention in Sierra Leone between May-June 2000, which not only helped to stabilize the situation in Freetown and its environs but also facilitated the UN's effort in setting up conditions for peacebuilding in that country.

Ankersen has pointed out that the military tool can be modified to deal with some non-coercive elements in conflict or post-conflict zones. For instance, in the vacuum of civil authority in Kosovo, soldiers assumed functions of the police. They responded to occurrences of domestic violence, sexual abuse, theft, and impaired driving — functions that would normally be undertaken by civilian police forces. In the temporary absence of a judicial system in Kosovo, the NATO military commanders filled in by running a detention facility and acting as jailor, judge and jury. Other activities undertaken by military forces in missions such as Kosovo have included: offering humanitarian relief; providing emergency shelter delivery, critical medical care, and food; helping local doctors establish practices in areas of mixed ethnicity; rebuilding bridges, road, houses, schools, churches and mosques; and guarding mixed ethnic schools so that children in

fragile peace situations could still get an education. These were not military tasks but were accomplished by the military instrument.

The ICISS report lists six threshold criteria for military intervention to ensure that the responsibility to react is not taken lightly. In the Commission's opinion those criteria are:

- Right authority — determining the legitimate actor that should approve the military intervention;
- Just cause — whenever there is the possibility of serious, irreparable and conscience-shocking harm being done to human beings (e.g. genocide, ethnic cleansing, forced expulsion, mass rape, other crimes against humanity and war crimes);
- Right intention — to halt or avert human suffering (not to advance a particular self-interest, to alter the borders of the target state, or to simply demonstrate one's coercive power);
- Last resort — when other diplomatic means of resolving the conflict have been exhausted;
- Proportional means — minimizing the scale, duration and intensity of the military intervention or keeping it in line with the magnitude of the original provocation (also there should be strict observation of the Geneva Convention and Protocols);
- Reasonable prospects — the criterion of reasonable chance of success should be kept front and centre (in other words, the military intervention should not ignite an even larger conflict).

The Canadian government and the Department of National Defence should use this threshold list systematically whenever the country is contemplating a military intervention, whether the UN, a regional body in which Canada holds membership, or a coalition of states, is considering such an intervention.

The Responsibility to Rebuild

As the ICISS report makes it quite clear, the responsibility to protect implies not only the responsibility to prevent violent conflicts and to react rapidly to those conflicts when they do break out, but also the responsibility to rebuild both state and civil society institutions that may be devastated by the violence.

Peacebuilding, as it has been practiced to date, involves a number of diverse instruments and players, and much like an orchestra, the instruments must be finely tuned and the players must work in concert in order to produce anything resembling a coherent approach to reconciliation and sustainable peace. As a multidimensional exercise, peacebuilding encompasses a variety of tasks such as: disarming warring parties, decommissioning and destroying weapons, de-mining, repatriating refugees, restoring law and order, creating or rebuilding justice systems, training police forces and customs agents, providing technical assistance, advancing efforts to protect human rights, strengthening civil society institutions, reforming and strengthening institutions of governance - including monitoring and supervising electoral processes and promoting formal and informal participation in the political process.

The players involved in peacebuilding are equally diverse - ranging from civil society and NGOs, governments, the military, international and regional organizations, *ad hoc* criminal tribunals, [and potentially the International Criminal Court (ICC)], to truth and reconciliation commissions and prominent individuals like the Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General. The complex character of peacebuilding reflects an acknowledgement of the multidimensional and integrated causes of civil war and of the need to address economic, social and political aspects of reconstruction and reconciliation.¹⁴

In light of the complex and multidimensional aspects of building peace in war torn societies, it is important for the Canadian government to develop multisectoral approaches to conflict transformation that involve grassroots, local, and NGO actors in the act of rebuilding both state and civil society institutions. Short term, medium term and long term issue will have to be tackled in the policy development. The objective of such a holistic method is to facilitate a fundamental transformation of conflict-ridden societies by addressing simultaneously both root causes of violent conflict as well as the symptoms. The government's approach to peacebuilding should therefore be to search for specific programs, policies and practices that can be employed to resolve civil conflicts and restore conditions to the point where peace can be sustained for the long haul.

Conclusion

The responsibility to protect norm is evolving from a norm that initially clashed with the state sovereignty/non-intervention norm to one that essentially fits into normative develops that have occurred in the international system and global community over the past 58 years or so. Canada, as an international norm entrepreneur, has been at the leading edge of this normative development. This country should continue in that role, but also use its reputation as a good international citizen to advocate for a greater assimilation of the component aspects of this responsibility to protect norm into the informal and formal processes of the UN, regional organizations, and individual nation-states. In doing so, the Canadian government will be helping to make this norm more robust.

Endnotes

¹ Frost, p.47 and Smith and Light.

² ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, p.9.

³ See Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and I. William Zartman (ed.), *Collapsed States* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

⁴ See Ramesh Thakur, *Developing Countries and the Intervention-Sovereignty Debate*, unpublished paper.

⁵ An Florini, *The Evolution of International Norms*, *International Studies Quarterly*, 40, 3 (September 1996), pp.377-78 and 382-83.

⁶ Ramesh Thakur, *Global Norms and International Humanitarian Law: An Asian Perspective*, *International Review of the Red Cross*, vol. 83, no. 841 (March 2001), p.35.

⁷ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, p.8.

⁸ G. John Ikenberry, *The Costs of Victory: American Power and the Use of Force in the Contemporary Order*, in Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur (eds.), *Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian*

Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000), pp.90-91.

⁹ Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p.62.

¹⁰ See <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/eadhome.htm>

¹¹ ICISS, p.17.

¹² UN, Report of the SG on the work of the Organization, pp.21-22.

¹³ W. Andy Knight, Conclusion , in Tom Keating & W. Andy Knight (eds.), *Building Sustainable Peace* (Edmonton; University of Alberta Press, forthcoming 2004).

¹⁴ For a good bibliography on Peacebuilding see <http://www.peacemakers.ca/bibliography/bib25evaluation.html>