

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Civilian Partnerships in Protection Operations Focussing Canadian Values and Know-How

Discussion Paper by Paul LaRose-Edwards, September 2003

Assumption 1

R2P is predicated upon a state (both government and civil society) having and exercising the responsibility to protect the human rights of the inhabitants of that state. Any international intervention, military or non-military, is an aberration and only tenable until that state can once again effect their responsibilities to protect. Thus any international intervention to protect human rights is the last option, and the **exit strategy of each and every intervention is the sustainable return of those functions to that government and civil society.** This truism or assumption is only restated so as to remind ourselves that Canada's underlying foreign policy on R2P is to help countries to strengthen their government and civil society. There are a galaxy of Canadian individuals already doing just that, both as individuals and through Canadian and international organizations (Canadian government, NGOs, UN, business community, etc.). Is it possible to achieve more holistic or coordinated Canadian interventions? How?

Assumption 2

International intervention occurs along a continuum of graduated responses. The narrow range of military intervention runs from military observers through interpositional forces through muscular peacekeeping to all out warfighting scenarios. Even at the far end of the warfighting scenarios, as Clausewitz regularly pointed out, there is no uniquely military solution. Most certainly in any UN mandated peace operation, be it a UN force or a UN mandated coalition of the willing, civilian factors are decisive and overriding. **Every Force Commander and all subordinate commanders must maximize their capacity to identify, partner and interoperate with civilians.** They must constantly fight the temptation to limit their exposure to politics and civilians, e.g. through those CIMIC type mechanisms that are driven by the Viet Nam 'hearts-and-minds' philosophy. This truism or assumption is only restated to remind us of the need to better integrate Canadian military interventions with civilian interventions. How can Canadian military make more use of Canadian civilians to more effectively achieve that integration and their larger mission objectives? How can Canadian civilian capacity act as a force multiplier for Canadian military?

Assumption 3

Canadian foreign policy would have more impact if there was a greater congruence, and at times synergy, of Canadians' international involvement and intervention. In broad terms, the various vehicles for Canadians' international involvement includes:

- Canadian government including DFAIT, CIDA, DND, SolGen/RCMP.
- Canadian NGOs including professional bodies and unions.
- Canadian businesses.
- Canadian individuals working for non-Canadian agencies including UN, international NGOs, private enterprise, etc. Note that this category is largely untapped with regard to Canadian congruence of effort, and arguably on the civilian side of international interventions, these individuals are more than 50% of the Canadians in the field.

How to network and coordinate even a small portion of the Canadian international 'players'? How to achieve greater synergies of Canadian effort?

Assumption 4

Coordination, interoperability, cooperation, partnerships, etc. all take time and effort, so they had better be worth the effort. Any mechanism that has a vested interest in functions such as calling

meetings, carrying out joint training, networking information and individuals, etc., will tend to expand those functions past the tipping point to where the time invested by the intended beneficiaries outweighs the benefits. **Any partnership mechanism needs inbuilt checks and balances to retain its usefulness, including some form of self-termination for when efforts outweigh benefits.** This truism or assumption is only restated to remind the author and the reader to apply such criteria to the following recommendations. Are increased partnerships with Canadian civilians to enhance international impact worth the effort? Or has Canada already maximized its international influence? Or have DFAIT and other Canadian mechanisms already achieved sufficient synergy of Canadian international capacity so that further partnership efforts will cost more than they are worth?

Strategies/Recommendations

Imbedding ‘Civilians’

Even internal governmental cooperation and coordination is problematic. This is partly due to normal organizational stovepipe-syndromes, but also reflects the various cultural divides between different Canadian government departments which easily confirm their ‘suspicions’ about the value of working or sharing with other departments. This paper does not address this challenge and many civil servants continue to work hard to overcome those natural divides within government. More germane to our discussion is the suspicion about ‘civilians’ outside of government, arguably a bigger divide.

The easiest and best way to advance Canadian government-civilian partnerships is to bring ‘civilians’ into various key departments — not at the recruit level but as experienced international-experts. One, it brings in an individual who has practical and recent ‘civilian’ knowledge/perspective, a value in itself. Secondly, that individual could increase the organizations’ comfort and ability to reach out and partner with other ‘civilians’. I am using ‘civilian’ in the sense of an individual who is new to being on staff with an organization and has not yet been transformed into being a career foreign service officer, military officer, RCMP police officer, or career CIDA development officer.

CIDA has been good at this. In the 1980s and more so in the 1990s, CIDA started to staff many positions with contract employees or rotating in mid-level individuals from NGOs. Importantly, many of them then deployed into the field. This was a natural fit with CIDA’s use of *implementing agencies*, mostly Canadian NGOs. There has been a useful revolving door as expert-‘civilians’ came and went, although this looks to be slowing down. DFAIT does not seem to have moved as far forward, perhaps a hold-over from the perception that foreign service officers were much like an officer-class which by and large needed to start as lieutenants and work their way up to generalship. DFAIT appears to have been less willing to send such expert-‘civilians’ into the field until they have been part of the department long enough to be fully re-cultured. At times this attitude in DFAIT has also acted as a barrier to utilizing the knowledge and expertise of Canadians outside of government, even those overseas in key posts with the UN, OSCE, and NGOs. Stories are legion about other embassies making more use of these Canadians than the Canadian embassy — Canadian deprecation? ...if they are Canadians they can’t be that much of an expert? However, certain DFAIT mechanisms like the Interview Program (ISIW) prove the exception to the rule. Within its limited resources, ISIW actively searches out returning Canadians and mines their knowledge with a view to disseminating those intelligence nuggets and insights throughout a variety of federal departments.

CIDA has a partnership with Consulting and Audit Canada to help identify experts, but that channel is not well known among many Canadians out in the field. In the reverse, CANADEM’s DFAIT funded Roster of Canadian ‘internationals’ is better known among Canadians in the field and thus much larger, but is less well known and used by CIDA. So far DFAIT appears to make relatively little use of mechanisms like CAC and CANADEM. As Canadian mechanisms to identify and engage ‘civilians’

become more inter-connected and well known, it is hoped that government will tap more into existing Canadian field expertise. This is not only an issue for the hiring of staff/consultants, as it is just as valuable that government consult with individual international experts. Presently consultations tend to occur just with known Canadian agencies such as NGOs. Those agencies have particularly valuable inputs and insights, but tend not to have the unique insider knowledge and perspective of an individual who is actually on staff with a UN peace operation, or serving with UNHCR in an upcountry refugee camp, or is a human rights monitor with OHCHR in Columbia, or an OSCE democratization expert in Tajikistan.

Recommendation - DFAIT and CIDA should look to make greater use of existing screened pools of Canadian international-experts both to recruit 'civilians' and to consult or draw information from individual Canadian international-experts not normally in the consultation-loop, such as those working with non-Canadian organizations.

DND has been even less open to involving 'civilians', particularly on the military side of the shop, and most certainly has been loathe to imbed them in military deployments. That military-civilian divide is traditional and understandable, and even partly acceptable in situations like a WWII or a Korean war. But perhaps at this point in time it has become an impediment to Canadian Forces capacity, impact, and sustainability?

DND has the unique ability to draw mission augmentees from the Canadian Reserves, ostensibly with 'civilian' skill sets. The problem however is that the Reserves have been constructed as a way to develop and call-up traditional military expertise. The reservists, some with valuable applicable civilian expertise, do not have their civilian skill-sets noted much less quantified. This is not unique to the CF, the US military have a similar problem and are struggling to find solutions. For example, the fact that an individual has been an assistant to an SRSG, or a human rights monitor, or an election observer, is probably only known by word of mouth at the unit level. Some thought has been given to gathering this information, but at this point DND feels it will be unable to 'screen' or quantify such expertise even if it was recorded, which it is not. Certainly DND needs to look to resolving this gap in the use of their reservists. Arguably if individual Canadians with such international skill-sets knew that they would be actively sought out and used as such by CF for peacekeeping deployments, they would be far likelier to enlist in the reserves and partly resolve the recruiting short-fall facing the CF.

But going beyond this, DND needs to find expanded ways to better involve (e.g. in pre-deployment ops planning or training) and even deploy small numbers of international-experts as 'civilian' augmentees even when they are not already reservists. This has occurred in a limited way with the very occasional use of DFAIT POLADs (Political Advisors), and even less frequently through embedding CIDA funded aid experts as occurred in Eritrea. CF must bear in mind the strictures of Clausewitz (there is no military solution) and the huge need for military interoperability with civilian agencies of the host country (government, NGOs, civil society, etc.) and civilian internationals (UN, OSCE, donors, NGO, etc.). CF needs to seriously consider new ways to bring in 'civilian' force magnifiers. For example, in the most recent ISAF deployment (as with the 1991-2 deployment), CF was strongly encouraged to engage one or more screened Afghan-Canadians who would have added immeasurably to all of their operational planning and ops, as well strengthening the more limited CIMIC objectives. Despite efforts by various Canadian military officers to do just that, the CF system proved to be impervious to such a new departure, and CF has had to have recourse to hiring local Afghans of unproven quality and loyalty.

Recommendation

The Canadian Forces need to identify and quantify the relevant civilian international skill-sets of regulars and reservists, and when those skill sets are not present in sufficient quantity, look to engage and even deploy screened civilian international-experts with those skill sets so as to act as force multipliers.

Further Strengthen UN/OSCE Ops with Canadian Experts

Canada deploys military peacekeepers, CivPol, or others, with the hope that they can either join or work alongside strong functioning peace operations or other such multilateral field operations. In a broader sense, it behoves Canada to strengthen UN and other multinational field operations.

In 1997 DFAIT decided to directly address the difficulties faced by the UN whenever it attempted to rapidly staff field operations. DFAIT set up a Canadian national roster, and as part of its ongoing foreign policy objective of strengthening the UN, it continues to fund the CANADEM Roster of now almost 5,000 individuals. This was a bold and sustained initiative by DFAIT, and Canada now has the largest and most openly accessible national civilian roster in the world.

The UN largely hires HQ and field staff directly, and so the DFAIT-funded Roster works well as the Roster is free to identify the best available candidates it has and market them with the UN. In keeping with Canadian values of not wanting to be seen to be unfairly influencing UN hiring practices, the Canadian government appears hesitant to back Canadians being put forward, except occasionally for senior posts at the D1 level or above. Even here the support occurs on an ad hoc basis, and it is not clear why some are backed and others not. Little effort is devoted to backing posts below the D1 level, i.e. the vast majority. Normally such a hands-off attitude would be exemplary. It would allow the UN and others the freedom of choice to select on merit from any country. The reality however is that many other countries commonly lobby, and those at the UN doing the selection can at times allow political factors to outweigh merit. So Canadian reluctance to modestly back Canadian candidates for the UN can at times work against the best outcome for the UN and for Canadian foreign policy objectives, so perhaps needs a bit of a re-think?

Most OSCE mission staffing differs from the UN as most OSCE mission posts are staffed through government seconded individuals. For this reason, the process of getting Canadians into OSCE missions is not always as smooth. On the Canadian end, the process of deciding which OSCE posts to fill and which Canadians to send to missions lacks some transparency and speed. For direct hire by the OSCE, the process works well, much like the UN direct hires. It should be noted that the Canadian Permanent Mission to the OSCE does actively support Canadian candidates.

Reference the strengthening of Canadian presence in multilateral agencies other than their field operations, it is worth noting that the closing down of the International Directorate of the Public Service Commission has left a bit of a gap in supporting Canadians short-listed for some D1 level posts and above. The comments above about apparent Canadian reluctance to back candidates for UN field operations similarly apply to the backing candidates for UN HQ posts, leaving possible scope for more a more strategic approach?

Recommendation

DFAIT needs to take the lead on developing a standing mechanism to strategically assess which UN and other multilateral missions and posts that Canada wants to strengthen; along with a concurrent mechanism to strategically match up the expertise of individual Canadian international-experts with particular posts; and cap this off with strategies on getting them into those posts. This already occurs on an ad hoc basis for the occasional D1 or above post, but there are many key posts at the P4 and P5 levels that would benefit from a strategic approach by Canada.

Team Canada in the Field - the strategic use of Canadians already in mission areas.

At the pointy end, in the field, there is another key way in which to focus and achieve synergy of Canadian effort — networking Canadians in the field. This networking happens naturally albeit in ad

hoc and partial ways. Serendipity of chance meetings or word-of-mouth does result in ad hoc partnerships. The subsequent sharing of information and common cause between Canadian individuals with common values and objectives has had immense pay-offs. The challenge is to maximize such 'team-Canada' partnerships without too much effort — harkening back to assumption #4, it has to be worth the effort.

One approach is to undertake a degree of joint training so as to develop an openness to partnering with other Canadians along with strategies for interoperability. DND with its large budget and strong understanding of the benefits of training, both generic and pre-deployment, does effect a degree of joint training. This perhaps needs to be expanded? The RCMP CivPol training does not, but their pre-deployment training does include a modest use of civilian trainers. Of course PPC was premised upon the principle of joint training, and a variety of other Canadian training institutes like Royal Roads and CIL/DFAIT are implementing the same philosophy. Some departments perhaps feel that such training is not necessary as they 'naturally' partner with fellow Canadians out in mission — as is well known by Canadians working in the field with the UN, OSCE, and NGOs, this is not exactly how it plays out.

While joint training is excellent in changing personal attitudes about working with other Canadian internationals, it of course tends not to connect the actual Canadians who will find themselves together in an area of operations. Because of cost, such training only gets to an extremely small part of the Canadian civilians who deploy internationally.

Perhaps a more feasible approach is to develop mission-specific mechanisms to foster 'team-Canada' attitudes and linkages — encourage and facilitate those actually deployed concurrently, to link-up and use each other in the field. For example, one financially modest solution would be to encourage mid and senior level Canadians to pass through Ottawa as they deploy and return from their UN or NGO post. Outgoing, they would be briefed on opportunities to connect with Canadian DFAIT, CIDA, and DND/CF in the field. They would explore strategies for how Canadians in the mission area could focus their common Canadian values and know-how to the benefit of their particular organizations as well as Canadian foreign policy objectives. On return or on home leave, they could be debr