Canada’s response to Darfur: Are we failing to live up to our ‘responsibility to protect?’

Current situation in Sudan

Chronic insecurity continues to plague Darfur, Sudan. Violence is escalating in North Darfur where Sudanese government forces have staged a new offensive against rebel groups who did not sign May’s Darfur Peace Agreement. In addition, the peace deal between the government and a major insurgent group is coming unglued. The Sudanese army and the fractious Darfur rebels are primed for a new military showdown. The cease-fire accord, brokered partly by the U.S., has shattered the rebel movement into dozens of small, competing bands. Once loosely united by the neglect and cruelty of the central government, the region’s squabbling rebels now maul each other. They are a messy obstacle to peace. Many have devolved into ethnic militias, or worse, simple bandits.

UN Aid Coordinator Jan Egeland said in late August that the humanitarian situation in Darfur was at its worst since 2004 and that humanitarian access continues to deteriorate. About 400,000 Darfuris have died in this genocide. There are 3.5 million people displaced and in refugee camps or on other desperate life-support systems.

On 11 September, 2006, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan underscored the importance of Khartoum’s acceptance of a new UN peacekeeping force for Darfur authorized by Security Council Resolution 1706. The resolution approved a force of more than 17,000 troops for Darfur but “invites the consent” of the Sudanese government for its deployment. Sudanese President Bashir and other officials in Khartoum have consistently opposed any new UN force in the country. The mandate of the existing African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) has been extended until the end of the year. The government in Khartoum accepts the mandate of the AMIS force; however, the force is ill-equipped and under-funded.

Another option is utilizing the NATO-ready rapid deployment force of 30,000 soldiers. The force might be the most expeditious way of both augmenting the African Union mission and underpinning the UN peacekeeping force.

Alternatively, on October 8, 2006, Arab countries launched a new effort to push Sudan toward a compromise over UN peacekeepers for Darfur, offering to dispatch a force of Arab and Muslim troops to the troubled region. This force, however, could be seen as supportive of the Islamic government in Sudan. And the Sudanese government itself rejected the initial proposal. The ancient roots of Darfur’s feuding will remain: racism between ethnic Arabs and Africans, and competition for threadbare natural resources – water and pastureland.

“A political settlement has been completely overlooked or downplayed by the U.S.,” according to Alex de Waal, co-author of the book Darfur: A Short History of a Long War. “The whole debate has gone off on a red herring – UN troops. From experience, we know that, ultimately, there is no real military solution to these kinds of complicated ethnic wars.”

Canada’s Position

The current government has stated that the situation in Darfur is a test for the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine. Canada has taken a two-pronged approach to dealing with the situation in Darfur: humanitarian aid and peace support. This does not include any further troop commitments.

Canada’s September 22, 2006 statement to a UN General Assembly hosted by the United States and Denmark read:

“…(the situation in Sudan) demands a decisive response from the UN Security Council and from all member states in seeking the implementation of resolution 1706. This is a clear test of the principle of responsibility to protect, endorsed by both the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council. The responsibility to protect must now move beyond abstract words to clear action.”

Prime Minister Stephen Harper was quoted in the Globe and Mail as saying “We want to help reform the justice system, rebuild a security system, reduce the traffic in arms and reinforce the institutions of government and community life. The government of Sudan will have to hand over the responsibility for the African Union mission in Sudan to the United Nations at the start of the new year, under African command.”

Canada’s Commitment

Canada has about 100 Canadian soldiers in Darfur acting as advisers to 7,000 African Union troops who are using borrowed Canadian armoured vehicles.

On May 23 2006, the day the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed, Canada increased its financial assistance to Sudan by $40 million. Of that, $20 million was allocated for urgent humanitarian needs, such as the provision of food aid, water and sanitation, basic health care, and the protection of, and assistance to, displaced populations in Sudan and in neighbouring countries. The other $20 million was earmarked to enhance AMIS’ ability to assist in the initial implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and lay the groundwork for a successful transition to a UN mission.

Considerations

The African Union stated on September 17, 2006 that its deployment plans for more troops from African nations are uncertain because of a continuing lack of funds.

Romeo Dallaire and others have noted that the AU force is so overstretched and under-equipped it cannot sustain its mission or renew its commitments. Dallaire has also criticized the Harper government for silencing Canada as a major player. Under the Liberal government, Canada had played an active role in hammering out the shaky Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja, Nigeria.

On September 27, 2006, former Prime Minister Paul Martin stated that “Canada’s military has the capacity to make a contribution” in Darfur. Mr. Martin said that Darfur has long been a priority for him and remained so. “The problem in Darfur is that there are insufficient troops on the ground… to protect not only the refugees but the people who are trying to protect the refugees.”

Senator Mobina Jaffer, who served as a special envoy to Sudan from 2002 until early this year, says Canada once stood at the forefront of western nations working towards peace in the country.  But Prime Minister Stephen Harper has done away with the special envoy, disbanded an advisory group on Darfur (that included General Dallaire), and now appears to be doing very little.

Questions to ponder…

Is the Canadian government failing to live up to its own test spelled out in the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine by failing to commit troops?

Is Canada shirking its leading political role within the international community by failing to strongly advocate more involvement by the International Criminal Court or stricter sanctions by the United Nations against the Sudanese government?

Should Canada contribute further funds to the African Union force, which was having some success before it was crippled by its lack of financial backing?

Do other world events such as the middle-east crisis take priority over crises in African countries?

Is Canada becoming complacent in the face of another Rwandan-style genocide?

Is Canada turning a blind eye towards Sudan at a time when radical Islamists are only too willing to fill a vacuum of power where hundreds of millions of petro-dollars are at stake?

The International Crisis Group, a non-profit NGO headquartered in Brussels, issued a report in June that recommended:

•   The Security Council should apply sanctions that target any side, including the government, that violates the ceasefire.

•   The AU should spare no effort to widen acceptance of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) by all stakeholders… and the U.S., the European Union and others should provide the political and financial backing that is needed for a successful Darfur-Darfur dialogue and consultation.

•   The UN and other international partners should assist the AU in immediately strengthening AMIS, and troop-contributing countries in Africa should bring the force up to its authorised ceiling.

•   The Security Council should authorize deployment of a robust UN force, starting with a rapid reaction component, to take over from the AU Mission in Sudan by October 1, 2006, with a clear Chapter VII mandate to use all necessary means to protect civilians and assist in the implementation of the DPA.

•   The EU and NATO should work with the UN and the AU to ensure that the peacekeeping force has the capability to react rapidly to ceasefire violations, and countries with advanced military capabilities should detail senior officers to the peacekeeping force to bolster its professionalism.