Iran nuclear program: A perilous Persian puzzle
by Simon Rosenblum

Nuclear proliferation has of late acquired a whole new lease on life. Only a few years ago it was India and Pakistan moving into the nuclear weapons club.  Now we are faced with the likelihood over the next 10 years of Iran and North Korea gaining nuclear weapons capability. When and if that occurs, regional nuclear arms races will undoubtedly break out in both Asia and the Middle East. The dangers associated with such an outcome are quite serious.

First, the greater number of nuclear weapon states simply increases the odds that sooner or later one of them will actually use a nuclear weapon. Nuclear deterrence will be severely tested and – pardon the phrase – a dangerous game of Russian roulette will be set in motion. Second, it is not simply a matter of how many more new nuclear weapon states are added to the list but, more ominously, which states. It should be obvious that the possibility of some regimes possessing nuclear weapons is more dangerous than would be the case of some others.

Iran is a good case in point. It is a country that with some regularity threatens to eradicate another state in its region (Israel) and which actively supports terrorist organizations. What such a regime, or conceivably one of its affiliated terrorist organizations, would actually do with nuclear weapons is uncertain and it is that very unpredictability that makes preventing it from getting nuclear weapons capability a much greater imperative than might otherwise be the case and justifies different means to preventing that from happening.

A digression may be useful here as there is a tendency to exaggerate the dangers of nuclear weapons. The nuclear disarmament/peace movement had in its heyday a marked characteristic of exaggerating the prospect of a nuclear war breaking out. The Helen Caldicotts of this world were well known for claiming that it was 50–50 at best if over the next 10 to 15 years the planet would avoid being destroyed by nuclear war. Others of us active in the movement were more responsible and understood that even if the odds of a nuclear weapon being used – as a result of new and more ‘useable’ nuclear weapons – were increasing from, let us say, five to 10 per cent over that timeframe, then that posed an unacceptable risk which needed to be brought under control given the consequences. Similarly, it is important to have an appropriate sense of proportion when it comes to the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Regrettably, with Iran, one cannot but agree with the International Crisis Group’s recent study which concludes, “There is no easy way out of the Iranian nuclear dilemma.” There is no doubt that Iran is actively seeking to develop nuclear weapons capability and its recent success in enriching uranium takes it an important step forward toward that goal. Iran, of course, claims that it is just seeking to develop a nuclear energy industry but nobody believes it. Experts are of the view that Iran is years, not decades away, from both having a nuclear weapon and also the means to deliver it.

The patience of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has pretty much come to an end and it is now up to the UN Security Council to decide on the next steps necessary. Diplomatic efforts, largely led by the EU and Russia involving economic incentives and assurances of a nuclear energy fuel supply fell apart last August. “Do you think you are dealing with a 4-year-old child to whom you can give some walnuts and chocolates and get gold from him?” was the response from Iranian President Ahmadinejad.

So now it is on to the Security Council, which should mandate a series of tough but graduated economic sanctions on Iran to get it to cease and desist from efforts to acquire a nuclear bomb. The likelihood of such a strong UN resolution being effective is uncertain and the always-quotable Iranian president has already voiced his contempt: “Those who want to prevent Iranians from obtaining their right should know that we do not give a damn about such resolutions.” Maybe, but there is a decent chance that such sanctions combined with incentives just might convince the Iranians to back off. However, we will probably not get to find out as China and Russia – with their growing economic ties with Iran – will likely prevent the Security Council from agreeing on sanctions strong enough to force Iran to rethink their position.

What about, as a final resort, a military attack on Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities? Some have tried to make a case for such an attack, but in practice the International Crisis Group is convincing when it concludes that a “preventable military force is both a dangerous and unproductive option” in this situation. Not only are Iran’s nuclear facilities widely scattered and bunkered, but such an attack could also spark a wider war and incite Iran-supported terrorism. No wonder that even Tony Blair has been forced to say that such a military action “is not on the agenda.”

We are seemingly left with a stalemate, a nuclear clock that is loudly ticking and no apparent answer to this perilous Persian puzzle. If this does not keep you awake at night worrying, it should.