Notes for a presentation by Fergus Watt,
Executive Director, World Federalists of Canada at the “Iraq Forum”

Sponsored by:
Centre for Security and Defence Studies, Carleton University, and
Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
November 18, 2002, Ottawa, Canada


In this segment I’d like to widen the focus of our discussion somewhat, moving from the detail of Security Council Resolution 1441 to look at the international political discourse leading up to the resolution. How has the debate over Iraq changed in the last four months? How has the deeper engagement of the international community affected the prospects for war?

Perhaps this brief look at where we’ve come in recent months will help illuminate some of the policy choices facing the government of Canada as well as setting up the last segment of today’s Forum, which will look at scenarios for the future.

1) Unilateral action?

It’s only a matter of a few months since the discussion over Iraq was a discussion over a unilateral military intervention, either by the U.S. alone or by the U.S., U.K. and a small number of allied governments.

In a landmark speech at West Point on June 1, U.S. President Bush warned that after September 11, the U.S. faces "a threat with no precedent," through the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the emergence of global terrorism. He warned that traditional strategies and doctrines were no longer sufficient; that deterrence meant nothing "against shadowy terrorist networks" and containment could not work "when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies." Under these circumstances, "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long." On this basis Bush claimed that the U.S. has the right to use military force preemptively, against any state that is seen as hostile or makes moves to acquire weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical or biological.

Iraq was to be the first major military campaign justified by this new “doctrine of preemption.”

Of course, it’s not as if the U.S. or other governments have never launched occasional preemptive military action in the past. They have. But Bush’s remarks sought to elevate preemption to a new level of operational doctrine. This led to ripples of nervousness throughout the international community, among the U.S. body politic, and within Bush’s own Republican Party.

And of course the problem with Bush's notions of preemption is that they de-stabilize international order and undermine some of the core precepts of international law. Whereas international law sanctions the use of force in self-defense or pursuant to a Security Council resolution, preemption validates striking first. It would justify the use of force in response to alleged intentions, potential links to terrorist groups, supposed plans and possible projects to acquire weapons of mass destruction and anticipations of future dangers. It is a doctrine without limits, without accountability to the UN or international law, and without any dependence on a collective judgment of responsible governments.

Regardless of the outcome in Iraq, we can expect continued discussion over the future political and legal conditions legitimating the use of force.

2) From unilateralism to multilateral engagement

Of course we now know that in the last couple of months the U.S. has been convinced to change course, to engage multilaterally and to take the issue to the UN Security Council. There are a number of reasons why this occurred.
- First of all, polls showed that a clear majority of Americans preferred that weapons inspections be tried before the resort to war; and polls also demonstrate that Americans would be much more comfortable with a war conducted with United Nations support. We would do well to remember that there is a strong, persistent wellspring of American public support for the UN.
- Second, America’s allies, including Canada, favoured carrying the debate to the Security Council. By doing so, the parameters of debate shifted to renewing the mandate for weapons inspection and disarmament. Renewing weapons inspections became not only a tool to constrain Saddam Hussein, but also to restrain the U.S.
- Thirdly, some influential voices in the Republican party weighed in. Former Secretary of State James Baker’s August 25 article in the New York Times, “The Right Way to Change a Regime” made the case that the U.S. policy of regime change would be advanced, not weakened, by going through the UN.
- And fourthly, these and other arguments were carried in the debate within the U.S. government, with the President nodding, for the time being, in favour of the “multilateralists” under Secretary of State Powell. Future outcomes in Iraq will be considerably affected by internal debate within the U.S. administration -- to a greater extent than any of the factors mentioned above (including whatever the world’s most important political forum – the UN Security Council - has to say on the matter).


3) Winners and losers

And so we’ve seen what looked in the summer like a dubious unilateral military adventure transformed into a multilateral process leading to the Security Council resolution that Peggy has just discussed.

The debate has changed. The debate has been joined by others. Can we identify who wins and who loses in the process?

First, the U.S. side of the ledger. The Security Council Resolution giving Iraq “one last opportunity to disarm” allows the U.S. to regain the moral high ground. Any future military campaign will enjoy wider public support, and wider support among UN member states. These are significant gains for the Americans, considering the possible costs of such a campaign, including its post-conflict phase.

President Bush is in a no-lose situation politically. If inspections succeed and invasion is thwarted, he can claim that the stated objective – that of disarming Iraq - has been achieved. If inspections fail, then Saddam Hussein will be seen to have brought war to Iraq through his own negligence.

And what about the UN?

The good news is the outcome of Resolution 1441. There is now a good faith understanding at the Security Council that weapons inspections will be given one more chance. The efforts by the international community to steer the discussion from “regime change” to the topic of weapons of mass destruction has succeeded. It is tremendously important to continue to support the inspectors in their work.

However, I would argue at the same time that the UN’s authority has been put at considerable risk.

In the first place, traditional international law norms have been distorted by the characterization of a weapons program as a threat to international peace and security. Iraq poses no current threat of attack to its neighbours. The Security Council has not disclosed a bona fide threat to international peace and security – classically defined as an attack or imminent threat of attack on another state - emanating from Iraq. If war ensues on the basis that Iraq’s weapons program per se threatens international peace, the Pentagon lawyers driving the radical notions of “preemptive defense” will have scored a major victory.

A second possible diminution of the UN’s authority stems from the lack of Security Council control over the course of the war. There is still some debate as to whether, in the event of Iraq’s non-compliance with inspections, the Security Council would be required to take another decision before the onset of war, or whether 1441 requires that the Council only meet and discuss the report of the weapons inspectors. But no one doubts the likelihood of military intervention should Iraq not comply with the inspections process.

When Colin Powell visited Ottawa last week, he said, “if the Iraqis do not co-operate, do not comply, do not work with the inspectors, do not take this opportunity to get rid of their weapons of mass destruction, then there will be consequences. And those consequences will involve the use of military force to disarm through regime change." (Emphasis added)

The problem here is that there is no international legitimacy to the goal of regime change. There is an international consensus to disarm Iraq. That is a valid and legal objective flowing from the ceasefire following the Iraq-Kuwait war and subsequent Security Council resolutions. It would not be inappropriate to contemplate enforcement action to complete weapons inspections and disarmament, as envisioned by the Carnegie Endowment’s proposals for “coercive inspections.” But nobody has bought in to regime change. Under the UN Charter and international law, the use of force is to be used proportionately and as necessary. The Security Council is the world’s primary political organ on matters of peace and security and has reached a consensus on the goal of completing weapons inspections in Iraq. The U.S. has a policy of regime change in Iraq. Distorting the weapons inspections mandate to achieve regime change would diminish the UN’s authority.

As you can see, this discussion of who wins and who loses following the agreement on Resolution 1441 is premature. We should fill in the scorecard in six months or a year. If the weapons inspectors complete their work successfully then any mischaracterization of the threat to the peace posed by Iraq will have been a small price to pay; diplomacy and multilateralism will have triumphed.

But we know of course that war may yet come. Iraq may choose not to comply with its international obligations. Or the stringent requirements and deadlines for inspections and disarmament may prove impossible to meet, as the Russian Ambassador warned immediately following the passage of 1441. Or some other unforeseen provocation may be the tripwire for war in this tense international context.

And if war comes, then the UN and the rule of law will have failed. The collective security system will lose some of its legitimacy and authority, for the reasons I mentioned above.

And not only will it be an unjust war, it bids fair to involve large-scale loss of human life. As usual, most of the casualties will be innocent civilians.

These general reflections on the rule of law principles and norms condition the conclusions I would draw as to the correct policy choices facing the government of Canada. Canada’s interest lies in a reliable framework of international law and multilateral institutions. There is an international legal and political consensus for weapons inspections. There is no such consensus for “regime change.”

Canada does not simply answer “Ready-aye-ready” when either the United States or the United Nations comes calling. Canada can be expected to assess the content and legality of the international mandate it is asked to support. Canada should vigorously support weapons inspections. And Canada should stay out of a wider war in Iraq.